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A commentary on
Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being
by Oakley, D. A., and Halligan, P. W. (2017). Front. Psychol. 8:1924. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01924
The authors of this paper (Oakley and Halligan, 2017) have an ambitious theory: Alter the
customary view that consciousness has a causal role in the brain’s activity, and the functioning
of the organism. They propose that “all psychological processing and psychological products are
the products of fast efficient non-conscious systems.” What has been supposed as the defining
characteristic of particularly human life, consciousness, “is a passive accompaniment to the non-
conscious processes.” This, they say, is a “logical conclusion” from a growing consensus over the
last 30 years.
They acknowledge that epiphenomenalism is not a new idea, and that non-conscious activity
is generally accepted. In fact Lancelot Law Whyte proposed in 1960 (see Whyte, 1960) that
“everything that man does and thinks arises from this challenging phenomenon: the unconscious
genesis of mental processes.” He dated the beginnings of the idea to 1700. The twist the authors offer
is that these non-conscious processes generate the Personal narrative (PN), which “has compelling
real-world face validity—particularly when linked to the notions of ‘self ’ and ‘personhood.’ While
previously attributed to “consciousness”—given its temporal association with the same—in our
account PN is not produced or in any way constrained by conscious experience” and crucially this
personal narrative serves “External and Cultural Broadcasting [which] are supra-individual.” This
is a mechanism for interbrain communication.
The difficulty the authors face is explaining how and why that with which we are completely
familiar has no causal power, but does exist in a way that is invisible to us as consciousness. Indeed
they say that they “have no option” but to use psychological language to describe this personal
narrative because they do not reform it in any way. So we have what seems an extraordinary
situation in which we know there are psychological states because we are conscious, but our
knowledge is irrelevant because what we know has no causal authority. Indeed, they recognize this.
“The exquisite temporal contiguity between personal awareness [consciousness] and the contents
of the personal narrative have . . . provided a reliable . . . explanation for a compelling causal
association between the two that remains particularly difficult to argue against.”
Actually, Oakley and Halligan cannot hold to their theory. For example, they say that “Personal
awareness” [consciousness] just ‘is’, though as humans we feel compelled to ‘explain’ it by
attributing a functional capacity, purpose, or meaning to it, and in so doing, we argue, has generated
a host of misconceptions.”
This passage exposes not merely the difficulty of arguing for non-conscious psychological states,
but avoiding causal consciousness itself. The argument employs us “as humans” rather than brain
functioning, and these humans feel compelled to “explain” by “attributing a functional capacity,”
etc. Unless they are proposing there can be non-conscious feeling, then consciousness has emerged
as an active agent in brain functioning. This consciousness leak undermines the argument generally.
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Of course, their argument might be that feeling can be
non-conscious, presumably like seeing and sensing! But the
problem here is the analogy of the rainbow to Thomas
Huxley’s epiphenomenal steam whistle. The whistle does nothing
causal; neither does the rainbow. Unfortunately, as with the
consciousness leak, the argument fails, for rainbows occur to
viewers, and no one views consciousness. Consciousness (e.g.,
feeling, seeing and sensing) just “is,” as they say.
Which brings us to the crux of the difficulty. The foundational
terms appear to designate things or states that exist as
“a given.” This is explicitly said about personal awareness
(consciousness), but equally applies to experience. If the aim
is to construct a scientific account of brain functioning (which
is mentioned on occasion), then all terms require to be given
physical status ab initio. The authors simply avoid doing so,
so one wonders what the aim of the paper is. Notoriously,
the topic of consciousness possesses no scientific definitions,
and millions of words are spilled with no defensible scientific
outcome.
However, the authors do identify characteristics which
require explanation. How can brains communicate with each
other with purely physical properties? Their method is by
making psychology non-conscious and rendering consciousness
epiphenomenal. Neither of these is convincing. There is an
alternative. That is given by the theory of brain-sign (model first
published in 2001) which sets out to achieve precisely the same
result, but by a different route.
Brain-sign theory states that consciousness does not exist, but
there is an actual physical brain phenomenon, brain-sign. Brain-
sign is the means/mechanism for interbrain communication in
collective action. It is derived moment by moment from the
causal orientation of each brain. Thus if A passes B a cup of
coffee, each brain signifies the part of the world which is the focus
of communal action, the cup of coffee (and much else besides).
The brain generates the brain phenomenon, brain-sign, from the
causal conditions and it has a biophysical role, which is to act
as the pointer to the part of the world to which the causality
of the brain is directed. Signification could not be by the actual
causal conditions of the brain, for they are massively complex
assemblies of electrochemical material. These causal conditions
are, of course, not available ‘to us’ as brain-sign: but why would it
be? ‘We’, as brain-sign, serve the brain’s physical role in achieving
survival and reproduction collectively. ‘We’ are not a knowledge
characteristic of brains.
The theory is extensive, but can be accessed in published
material (Clapson, 2014, 2016, 2017). However, a couple of
contrasts can be made between it and the Oakley/Halligan
account. Firstly a precise role is given to the brain phenomenon
with its ontology that of a physical sign, an operational element
across biology: for example, the chromatic changes of the
chameleon or cuttlefish; the tail of the peacock; the call of the
vervet monkey identifying specific predators. Secondly, brain-
sign theory offers neuroscience both a coherent and precise way
of approaching brain architecture, for brain-sign is part of brain
function and not an unspecifiable entity operating in a different
and conflicting way from the causal brain, i.e., consciousness.
This is surely a more satisfactory option.
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